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Abstract 
 
Kobayashi (2003) aims to show that, in a model without inflationary bias, an increase in the degree of multiplicative 
uncertainty on the transmission mechanism of monetary policy improves social welfare when central bank’s preferences 
are highly uncertain. We demonstrate that this result applies only to the case in which society is strictly conservative, 
i.e., when the weight attached to output in the social welfare function is lower than one. 
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Revisiting the role of multiplicative uncertainty 
in a model without inflationary bias  
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
In a recent contribution, Kobayashi (2003) sets out to show that, in a model without inflationary 
bias, an increase in multiplicative uncertainty in the transmission mechanism of monetary policy 
improves social welfare if the degree of central bank (CB) “opacity” is high enough, i.e., if the 
weights attached to its objective function are sufficiently uncertain. We show that this result holds 
only in a specific case, i.e., when society is “conservative” and provide an explanation for this 
result. 
 
2. Kobayashi’s (2003) model 
Kobayashi’s (2003) model (in logs) is made up by a private sector forming rational expectations on 
inflation and a CB setting the money supply in order to minimise the loss function: 
 
( ) ( ) 221 yLMA αλπα −++= , 0>λ  (1) 
 
where y is output, π  inflation, [ ]λα ,1−∈  is a random variable,1 with expected value E(α) = 0 and 
variance 2ασ , which represents the degree of opacity associated with CB’s preferences. The welfare 
loss function for society as a whole is: 22 yLS λπ += . It is hence ( ) ( )MAS LELE = : the central 
banker is randomly selected from society.  
Aggregate supply is given by a Lucas “surprise” function, with the natural rate of output 
normalized to zero: 
 
εππ −−= ey  (2) 
 
                                                 
1 Note that the extrema of the interval [-1; λ] represent the cases of “fully populist” and “fully conservative” CB, 
respectively. 
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where eπ is expected inflation, and ε is a supply shock with zero mean, E[ε] = 0, and constant 
variance 2εσ . By setting the money growth rate, m, the CB can imperfectly control inflation, due to 
multiplicative uncertainty in the transmission mechanism of monetary policy: 
 
( )mv+= 1π  (3) 
 
where v is a random variable with E(v) = 0 and constant variance 2vσ ; α, v and ε are independently 
distributed.2 
The game is solved by employing a standard backward procedure, so that minimisation of 
(1) subject to (2) and (3) gives the CB’s reaction function:3 ( )( )( )( )211 v
e
m σλ
επαλ
++
+−= . Since in the 
absence of time inconsistency problems  it is 0=eπ ,4  it follows that: 
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The expected social loss is hence: 
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An increase in multiplicative uncertainty ( 2vσ ) decreases 2πσ  (the variance of inflation), 
but has an ambiguous effect on 2yσ  (the variance of output). By calculating the derivative: 
 
                                                 
2 The presence of α raises the question of how rational agents should behave and form their expectations in repeated 
games, conditional on having information on λ, which is a behavioural – thus known – parameter. In the literature on 
CB transparency it is generally assumed that it is difficult for the private sector to disentangle the effects of preference 
uncertainty and other random shock (e.g., ε and v), so that also in a repeated game setting the hypothesis on the 
probability distribution of λ can be maintained (see, e.g., the discussion in Muscatelli 1998). 
3 The timing of the game is as follows: (i) the private sector forms rational expectations; (ii) the supply shock ε occurs; 
(iii) α is revealed only to the CB; (iv) the CB chooses m; (iv) v materializes, and inflation and output are obtained. 
4 This is basically due to the fact that, there being no distortions in the economy, both players share the same bliss 
points: πB = yB =0. 
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Kobayashi gets that an increase in 2vσ reduces social loss if 22 ασλ < . If opacity is high enough, the 
effect of the increase in multiplicative uncertainty on the variance of inflation will dominate that on 
the variance of output, and Brainard (1967) conservatism principle, in the face of multiplicative 
uncertainty, allows to improve social welfare. 
 
3. Revisiting Kobayashi’s (2003) result 
Is it possible that the condition 22 ασλ <  may hold without constraints? In this section we show 
that, in general, it is necessary to pose some bound on the magnitude of opacity 2ασ .  
As α must take values in a compact set, it is necessary to assess the behaviour of the 
variance of a random variable subject to the qualifications: [ ]λα ,1−∈  and E(α) = 0. The general 
problem of characterizing the moments of a random variable subject to specific constraints (e.g., to 
take values in a compact set) is a well-known issue in mathematical statistics (see, e.g., Kemperman 
1968) and, without entering the general geometric approach that can be employed to solve this 
problem, the following sketchy argument may be sufficient for our purpose (Ciccarone, Di 
Bartolomeo and Marchetti, 2007).  The probability distribution of α ensuring the highest variance is 
the one that assigns positive probability values only to the extrema of α (–1 and λ) and zero 
elsewhere: 
 
( ) p~11 −=α   and  ( ) p−= 1~2 λα  
 
  The distribution p is subject to the following constraint on the expected value: 
( ) ( ) ( ) 011 =−+−= λα ppE . We can thus set the problem of finding the distribution p which 
maximises the variance of α: 
( ) ( ) 222 10max λασα ppEp −+=−=  
s.t.   ( ) ( ) 01 =−−= ppE λα  
  
From the first order conditions it straightforwardly follows that: λ
λ
+= 1maxp . The maximum value 
for the variance is hence: 
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( ) λλλλλλσα =⎟⎠⎞⎜⎝⎛ +−++= 2max2 111  
 
 Thus, if 1>λ , it can never be 22 ασλ < : increases in multiplicative uncertainty always 
reduce expected social welfare. The opposite result may hold only if 10 << λ , i.e., society is 
strictly “conservative” (and the CB is “conservative on average”). In this case, the sign of 
expression (5) depends on the sign of its numerator, which is a continuous and monotonically 
decreasing function of 2ασ ; this sign may be negative for relatively high values of 2ασ .  
 
4. Discussion 
Given the variance of the output shock, the variance of inflation 2πσ  depends (see equation 4): 
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The variance of output, 
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Hence: 
1. an increase in opacity raises the variability of both inflation and output, thus worsening 
social welfare; 
2. an increase in 2vσ  reduces 2πσ  but increases 2yσ : 
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2.1. if 2ασλ =  (maximum opacity) the effects of an increase in 2vσ  on 2πσ  and on 2yσ  
are the same in absolute value: if 1<λ , ( ) 02
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2.2. if 2ασλ >  an increase in 2vσ  reduces 2πσ  less than it increases 2yσ ; we must then 
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compare (in absolute values) 2ασ  with 232 αλσλλ −+ . If 1>λ  and 02 =ασ  it will of 
course be 2232 αα σλσλλ >−+ . As 2ασ  is increased above zero, the left hand side 
falls more than the right hand side increases, but when 2ασ  reaches its maximum 
value 2ασλ =  we know that 2
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σ  because the 
greater volatility of output, multiplied for a weight greater than one, has a negative 
effect on social welfare which is always greater than the positive effect produced by 
the lower volatility in inflation, multiplied for a weight equal to one. 
 
The fundamental difference between our result and Kobayashi’s interpretation lies in the 
fact that the constraint 2ασλ ≥  univocally determines the sign of  ( ) ( ) 0112 2222
22
2
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y .  
Private agents always set πe = 0, thus never compensating the output shock, even when they 
face greater uncertainty when forecasting the CB’s behaviour; thus the greater source of uncertainty 
associated with α leads them to make greater ex-post inflation forecast errors.  
A more populist CB tries to “translate” the effect of the output shock more on the variability 
of inflation, but this does not guarantee that the volatility of output decreases (the more so the 
higher is opacity). This kind of behaviour is contrasted by Brainard’s conservatism principle, which 
leads the CB to be more prudent in the use of its instrument m: the variability of inflation falls, as 
the CB is less inclined to react to the supply shock by changing the value of the monetary 
instrument.  
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If the economy is in the optimal social point, π = 0 and y = 0, and a negative shock ε (which 
produces an expansionary effect on y) occurs, the CB observes the shock ε and reacts by decreasing 
( )
( )( )εσλ αλ 211 vm ++
−= . The greater 2vσ  the lower the reaction, the lower the fall in inflation and the 
greater the increase in output. Hence, an increase in 2vσ  brings the CB’s actual behaviour closer to 
the expectation made by the private sector  that the CB will maintain π = 0.  
The consequences of an increase in multiplicative uncertainty are amplified by the size of 
2
ασ . The greater is opacity the greater is the (negative) effect of 2vσ  on 2πσ , according to 
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If 2vσ  increases the CB becomes more prudent and inflation variability (which is a 
component of output variability) falls. The greater is opacity the sharper is this effect and the lower 
is the increase in output variability. Both effects improve the consequences of greater multiplicative 
uncertainty on expected social welfare (even though the direct effect of greater opacity on expected 
welfare is negative, as it increases both 2πσ  and 2yσ ). This is not due to any influence of greater 
opacity on the private sector’s behaviour (its instrumental variable is always equal to zero), but 
simply to the fact that the greater uncertainty produced by the “wider” variability of CB’s 
preferences magnifies the effects of multiplicative uncertainty.  
When opacity is at its maximum value, 2ασλ = , the effects of an increase in 2vσ  on 2πσ  and 
on 2yσ  exactly compensate each other, and it is the weight attached to output variability (λ) that 
establishes the sign of ( )2
v
SLE
σ∂
∂ . The problem is hence that, with 1>λ , the statistical bound on 2ασ  
prevents this form of uncertainty from spreading in a sufficient manner its positive influence on 
expected welfare, something that can instead happen when the weight attached by society to output 
variability is lower than one.  
 
5. Conclusion 
We have shown that for Kobayashi’s (2003) result to hold society (as well the CB “on average”) 
must be conservative, i.e., in the social welfare loss it must attach to output a weight (λ) lower than 
one. From the technical point of view, this is due to the fact that there exists a maximum value for 
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opacity, which can never be greater than λ. This constraint prevents an increase in multiplicative 
uncertainty from lowering “enough” the variability of output. From the economic point of view, the 
increase in multiplicative uncertainty makes the CB more prudent and inflation variability falls. The 
greater is opacity the sharper is this effect and the lower is the associate increase in output 
variability (which depends also on inflation variability). Both effects have favourable consequences 
on expected social welfare, but when society is populist the statistical bound on opacity prevents it 
from spreading in a sufficient manner its positive influence on expected welfare, something that can 
instead happen when λ is lower than one: when multiplicative uncertainty increases, greater opacity 
can be beneficial to society only when the CB is expected to be conservative.  
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